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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is 
raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable 
epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section draws 
upon Evelyn Brister’s work on contextualism and scepticism as well as more recent work on 
conceptual engineering to argue that the possibility that our knowledge discourse could be 
manipulated by nefarious actors warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and 
provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier attempts to 
raise the epistemic standard in order to shut down inquiry.  
1. Contextual Variability 
The idea of an individual raising the epistemic standard will be familiar to many; the idea that one 
may raise the epistemic standard wrongfully less so. In order to broach the idea of wrongful raisings, 
we will need to clarify what is meant by ‘epistemic standard’ for the purposes of this paper. One 
problem in even discussing the idea of a variable epistemic standard is that it is nearly always tied 
to a particular theory that is controversial to some extent e.g. contextualism, pragmatic 
encroachment, semantic relativism etc. By contrast, my approach in this paper will be to begin 
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with a notion of the epistemic standard that captures the idea that it can vary across contexts while 
remaining neutral on a number of theoretical issues. In doing so, the conclusions of this paper can 
remain neutral regarding, for example, the truth of epistemic contextualism. The remainder of this 
section will be devoted to developing this suitable neutral notion.  
It is best to understand the notion of an epistemic standard by first considering the apparent 
contextual variability of knowledge-attributing sentences. Context-shifting experiments, such as 
DeRose’s bank case (DeRose 1992) and Cohen’s airport case (Cohen 1999) show that a sentence 
of the form “S knows p” appears true in one context and false in another. This is so even though 
the two contexts do not vary in the subject, the purportedly-known proposition, and the epistemic 
standing the subject is in regarding that proposition.1 Typically, the differences between the two 
contexts lie only in the practical stakes in being right or in the kind of alternatives to the proposition 
that have been made salient. This variation in the apparent truth value of knowledge attributions 
stands in need of explanation, as traditional invariantist views would assign the same truth value 
to each knowledge claim.  
One way to explain this is to adopt epistemic contextualism – to claim that the truth-conditional 
content of knowledge attributions can vary across different contexts of utterance, and that the 
above cases are cases where such variation occurs. However, while many will be familiar with this 
line of reasoning towards contextualism, few would take such a line to settle the matter. The 
problem is that there are many other ways to explain the context-shifting experiments. Firstly, 
there are pragmatic encroachment views of knowledge, such as subject-sensitive invariantism 
(SSI). Whereas contextualism is primarily a semantic view on the truth conditions of knowledge 
attributions, pragmatic encroachment views are primarily metaphysical views on the nature of 
knowledge. For example, SSI claims that knowledge is a tertiary relation between a subject, a 
 
1 Here, “epistemic standing” is used as a kind of placeholder for the truth-relevant features that, together with truth 
and belief, determine whether a subject truly knows. The reader is free to replace this phrase with their favourite 
third condition, such as justification, warrant, evidence, reliability, safety, etc. 
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proposition, and the practical stakes the subject has in being right about the proposition 
(Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 2005, Fantl and McGrath 2009). This kind of view can capture the 
context-shifting experiments without thereby adopting a contextualist semantics, provided that 
there is some variation in the practical stakes of the subject.2 Secondly, there are pragmatic 
approaches, which provide a pragmatic explanation of the intuitive difference in truth value across 
the context-shifting experiments. For example, it might be claimed that if Keith utters “I do know 
the bank will be open” in a high standards context, what he says is true (contrary to intuition), but 
he thereby flouts the Gricean maxim of relation (i.e. be relevant), and so communicates the related 
proposition that he can rule out certain alternatives that are salient in that context (Rysiew 2001, 
2005). Such a view can capture the intuitive truth values of the knowledge attributions in each 
context while denying the contextualist claim that there is a context-sensitive semantics. Thirdly, 
there are epistemic relativist views that will claim that the truth values of knowledge attributions 
can vary across different contexts of assessment. For the relativist, it is not that the content 
communicated by uttering a knowledge sentence is dependent upon the context it is uttered in; 
the content remains invariant. Instead, when it comes to assessing the truth of such an utterance, 
the proper outcome of the assessment is dependent upon certain parameters that the assessment 
is made in. In one important sense, the relativist posits a kind of (truth value) context-sensitivity 
that outstrips the contextualist view. They will claim that there can still be a variation in truth value 
even if all features of the context of utterance remain fixed (relativists often illustrate this by 
appealing to retraction cases (MacFarlane 2011)). These three alternatives illustrate that there are 
numerous theoretical options on the table, and that as a result, arguing directly from context-
shifting experiments to epistemic contextualism (or any one of these alternatives) is not plausible.3  
 
2 Assuming that pragmatic encroachment views will adopt a semantics that reflects the underlying metaphysics (not 
a trivial assumption, but not one that is easy to reject either), then pragmatic encroachment views will adopt a 
semantics that allows for a variation in truth value across contexts where the practical stakes of the subject of the 
knowledge attribution varies (as in the Bank case and Airport case). The context-sensitivity predicted by 
contextualism is broader than this: contextualism will claim that there can be variation across contexts of utterance 
even when all relevant facts about the subject (including her practical stakes) remain fixed.  
3 See: (Gao, Gerken, and Ryan 2017) for further criticism of DeRose’s “methodology of the straightforward”.  
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Furthermore, which of these broad approaches is more plausible depends a great deal on the 
further detail that is added to them. For example, contextualist and relativist views are plausible to 
the extent that they provide a plausible semantics, and pragmatic approaches are plausible to the 
extent that they provide a plausible pragmatics. This makes philosophical discussion on these 
issues difficult not only because they partly rely on further issues in related empirical fields (e.g. 
linguistics and psychology), but also because they are affected by issues within the related fields 
that are of a much more general nature than the topic of knowledge attributions. For example, the 
plausibility of epistemic contextualism will depend on more general questions regarding context-
sensitivity: how pervasive is context-sensitivity in natural language? And are there specific tests for 
identifying cases of context-sensitivity? Our final position on the plausibility of contextualism will 
not be settled until we can find answers to these more general questions, and a similar point applies 
to all of the alternative views.  
Described in this way the state of play regarding such theories can seem quite desperate. However, 
I am in fact optimistic that such issues can be resolved in the future. For the purposes of this 
paper, we are interested not in what divides these views but what unites them. All of the above 
views allow that there is a kind of contextual variability in the way we attribute knowledge. Yet far 
less attention has been paid to how this fact alone could impact upon, or be impacted by, other 
areas of epistemological interest, such as the value problems of knowledge or epistemic harms and 
injustices.4 One clear reason for this is that thus far we have only been able to frame the discussion 
of this epistemic variability in the terms of one of the above theories, each of which are 
controversial. Consequently, an investigation of the type I have described – focused as it is on 
wrongful raisings of the epistemic standard - appears uninteresting because it is based upon a 
premise that is not obviously acceptable.   
 




But things need not be this way. The solution lies in finding neutral terms with which to describe 
the phenomenon in question, which will enable us to investigate the phenomenon in such a way 
that it does not matter whether contextualism, SSI, relativism, etc. is true. We need a way to 
describe the difference between the two contexts in cases such as DeRose’s bank case and Cohen’s 
airport case. Why, for example, does it seem true for Keith to say that he knows the bank will be 
open in the low context, but false to say that he knows in the high context? One approach would 
be to remain strictly committed to the merely descriptive claim that the intuitive truth values vary 
across the two contexts. Of course, this would still be subject to confirmation via observation of 
our intuitive truth values, and this is something that has already occurred to some extent in the 
experimental literature (Hansen and Chemla 2013, Grindrod, Andow, and Hansen 2018). In this 
paper, I will adopt a slightly stronger claim: that not only does it appear that there is a variation in 
communicated content across the two cases, but that there really is a variation in communicated 
content. The claim I am interested in can be outlined as:  
Modest variability: What a knowledge attribution communicates about the epistemic 
position that the subject is in can vary across contexts of utterance even while the 
following remain fixed: the subject, the proposition claimed to be known, the truth 
of the proposition, and the epistemic standing that the subject is in regarding the 
truth of that proposition. 
Modest variability is an interesting claim about our epistemic practices, and it is one that all of the 
above views agree upon.5 In the next section, I hope to show how modest variability can be 
theoretically useful insofar as it allows us to investigate further epistemological issues in a relatively 
 
5 This does not mean it is entirely uncontroversial. For example, more recently a number of views have defended the 
claim that what is communicated does not vary across the two contexts, but that the intuitions that we hold 
regarding such cases are affected by certain general heuristics that can explain why our intuitions are wrong. For 
example, Williamson (2005) argues that the bank case can be explained via appeal to the availability heuristic, which is 
that people tend to think that if a possibility is made salient, then it is more likely (e.g. plane crashes and shark 
attacks are often perceived to be more likely than they in fact are). See: (Nagel 2010, Gerken 2013) for similar 
appeals to heuristics.  
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neutral manner. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss certain features of modest variability 
further.  
First, it should be noted that in seeking more neutral terms, I have resorted to a communicative 
claim about what knowledge attributions communicate. This is a claim that all of the previously-
discussed views would accept insofar as they attempt to explain the bank case, and the bank case 
and other context-shifting experiments are cases where the intuitions in question are focused on 
communicative acts. Of course, pragmatic encroachment views of knowledge do not primarily 
phrase their view in terms of communicated content, but if their view is going to provide an 
explanation of the bank case and other context-shifting experiments, it will be under the 
assumption that the acceptability of attributing knowledge is tracking the underlying metaphysical 
issue of whether the subject in question has knowledge. All of the other views I considered are 
views about what knowledge attributions communicate. So in using these terms, we can capture a 
truth that all of the above views accept. 
Note also that the notion of “communicated content” remains neutral about whether the content 
in question is generated by semantic or pragmatic means. At this point an objection could be raised 
that modest variability is too neutral and that it is thus entirely uncontroversial, simply because what 
we communicate using any sentence will vary across contexts. Take a mathematical statement such 
as “2+2=4”. Mathematical statements like this are usually thought to be the best example of a 
sentence that communicates invariant content. If there is a non-empty set of context-invariant 
terms in a language, then it seems plausible that mathematical terms would be included as 
members. Yet what is communicated by the above statement can nevertheless vary across contexts, 
and this is simply due to the ability of speakers to generate highly particularised conversational 
implicatures. Consider Jack and Jill and Mike and Molly, who are looking for a restaurant for a 
double-date. They go to a busy restaurant and ask the maître d’ if they have a table available. The 
maître d’ states that they have a table for three. Annoyed, Jack says “Well, 2+2=4”. In doing so, 
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Jack is communicating that a table for three is no good and perhaps that the maître d’ should not 
have mentioned the table for three. This suggests that any sentence can vary in its communicated 
content because for any sentence there are particular contexts in which speakers can use that 
sentence to communicate highly-particularised messages. So, the objection goes, modest variability 
does not pick out something interesting about our epistemic practices; it ascribes an uninteresting 
property to knowledge sentences that is possessed by any sentence in a language.  
It is important to see how modest variability avoids this objection. Modest variability states that 
what knowledge attributions communicate about the epistemic position that the subject is in regarding the 
particular proposition can vary across contexts. That is, it claims that the variation in content is not in 
terms of some issue entirely divorced from attributing knowledge, but the variability concerns the 
central topic that knowledge attributions are about. So of course, knowledge attributions can be 
used to communicate highly particularised implicatures, and in this sense it is uncontroversial that 
their communicative content can vary. But the interesting claim we are concerned with is that what 
knowledge attributions communicate about a given epistemic position can vary, regardless of 
whether this is generated semantically or pragmatically. 6 
There is good reason to think that the level of description employed by modest variability, while 
more neutral than those party to these debates are used to, is in fact the appropriate level of 
description for what might be described as the traditional approach to epistemology. One classical 
project in epistemology is to undertake a conceptual analysis for KNOWS i.e. provide necessary and 
 
6 An anonymous reviewer questions whether certain pragmatic accounts of the apparent variability of knowledge 
attributions would be committed to modest variability. For instance, a pragmatic account might claim that in high 
stakes contexts, a knowledge attribution would conversationally implicate that the subject can rely on the 
proposition in question given their practical purposes or their stakes. And this implicated proposition, it might be 
claimed, doesn’t strictly communicate anything about the subject’s epistemic standard, it is only a claim about what 
propositions the subject ought to rely on. Now as has been widely recognised in the pragmatic encroachment 
literature, whether the subject ought to rely on the truth of a proposition, given their practical purposes, depends on 
how strong the subject’s epistemic position is with regard to the proposition. It is in this respect that I take there to 
be variation in what is communicated about the subject’s epistemic position even on the above view. But I recognise 
here that ideally the phrase “communicates about the subject’s epistemic position” would be replaced with one that 
more clearly picks out the kind of communicative variation that is of epistemic interest. As it stands, I take the 
phrase to work well enough for the purposes of the paper.  
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sufficient conditions for the application of the concept. It is often acknowledged that one form of 
of evidence that philosophers draw upon in order to correctly capture this is our linguistic 
intuitions – roughly, when it would be appropriate to attribute knowledge and when it would be 
appropriate to deny it. But, as Chomsky and others have noted, the bare linguistic intuitions we 
possess are blind to substantive theoretical matters such as semantic and pragmatic content:  
We may make an intuitive judgment that some linguistic expression is odd or 
deviant. But we cannot in general know, pretheoretically, whether this deviance is 
a matter of syntax, semantics, pragmatics, belief, memory limitations, style, etc., or 
even whether these are appropriate categories for the interpretation of the 
judgment in question. It is an obvious and uncontroversial fact that informant 
judgments and other data do not fall neatly into clear categories: syntactic, 
semantic, etc. (Chomsky 1977, p. 4) 
Some already recognise this. For example, Pritchard (2012) provides a taxonomy of the intuitions 
that epistemologists draw upon in the project of providing an account of knowledge. For our 
purposes, he distinguishes between extensional intuitions – intuitions about particular cases regarding 
when knowledge is present and when it is absent – and linguistic intuitions – intuitions regarding 
when it is appropriate or inappropriate to attribute knowledge. One may worry that there isn’t an 
important sense in which these two sets of intuitions come apart, but Pritchard argues that they 
do come apart in cases where attributing knowledge would also communicate some pragmatic 
content e.g. implicated content (Pritchard 2012, p. 95). So epistemologists do often appeal to our 
linguistic intuitions as one of the evidence bases to form our theory around, but as Pritchard and 
Chomsky recognise, this evidence basis is neutral to the more specific issues of semantics, 
pragmatics, and otherwise. As a result, claims like modest variability more faithfully captures the 
evidence base that philosophers draw upon. 
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Once we have accepted modest variability, it becomes natural to think of the variability in terms 
of a variable epistemic standard. Contextualists, for example, usually claim that the epistemic 
standard relevant to the truth of knowledge attributions can be higher or lower across contexts, 
and it is this that differs across various contexts. We can capture modest variability in terms of a 
variable epistemic standard as follows: in attributing knowledge, we communicate that a subject’s 
epistemic position meets the epistemic standard, and this standard can be more or less demanding 
across different contexts of utterance. Thus, the variability in what knowledge attributions 
communicate can be described in terms of a variable epistemic standard. It is this notion of the 
epistemic standard that will be used throughout the remainder of this paper. Employing this notion 
allows us to investigate the phenomenon in question – inappropriate raisings of the epistemic 
standard – in a way that is not premised upon the truth of some controversial theory.  
In this section, I have outlined modest variability as a more neutral claim that captures a fact about 
our knowledge-attributing behaviour and that is widely accepted across the literature. This 
variability is naturally understood via appeal to an epistemic standard that varies across contexts. 
The key point of this section has been that in employing a less committed notion of the epistemic 
standard, we become freed up to explore its impact upon our epistemic lives in a way that is not 
premised upon a particular controversial theory. The remainder of this paper serves as an 
illustration of that point. I will identify and diagnose a kind of epistemically unacceptable behaviour 
related to the varying epistemic standard. To do so, it is useful to first consider the interaction 
between varying epistemic standards and a much-discussed sceptical argument. 
2. The sceptic as bully 
Once we allow that there is a variable epistemic standard that at least affects what we communicate 
in attributing knowledge, the question arises as to whether there is a sense in which this variable 
epistemic standard could be misused in some way. Are there certain normative principles 
surrounding the epistemic standard, or certain harms or even injustices that can arise in relation to 
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the epistemic standard? It may be that, while the epistemic standard serves its function in a good 
deal of cases, it is nevertheless prone to manipulation by nefarious actors. Brister (Brister 2009, 
2017) has argued that if we accept the contextualist account of sceptical arguments, the sceptic can 
be viewed as this kind of nefarious actor insofar as they attempt to raise the epistemic standard to 
an extreme level. Consider the much-discussed closure-based sceptical argument: 
1. I don’t know I’m not a brain in a vat. 
2. If I know I have hands, then I know I’m not a brain in a vat.  
3. Therefore, I don’t know I have hands.  
The argument appears valid and the two premises seem difficult to deny. Yet the conclusion is a 
form of scepticism that appeals to few. According to the standard contextualist explanation, 
premise 1 raises the epistemic standard to a level where we are now considering brain-in-a-vat 
scenarios, and so, because a brain-in-a-vat scenario is not something that we have any evidence 
against, 1 becomes something true in the sceptical context. But this only shows that the argument 
is effective within the confines of the sceptical context. In more ordinary contexts, where a less 
demanding standard is in play, 3 would not be true. Certainly, this kind of explanation does raise 
further questions,7 but for our purposes the important point is that according to this explanation, 
the sceptic forces a high epistemic standard upon us by appealing to remote possibilities that we 
cannot rule out. Brister notes that there is an element of hostility in this behaviour, that the sceptic’s 
move of raising the epistemic standard to such a high level is an “arbitrary deployment of epistemic 
power” (Brister 2017, p. 64). Elsewhere, she states: “from this perspective skepticism is a kind of 
power grab that puts other epistemic agents on the defensive and at a disadvantage. While some 
might believe that knowledge is power, the skeptic recognises that denying knowledge is power” 
(Brister 2009, p. 682). Something like this idea will guide the remainder of this paper, but given 
 
7 Two pertinent questions are: i) is 1 true in less demanding contexts? ii) Can we still hold on to a principle of 
epistemic closure on this account?  
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what was said in the previous section, we need to view the sceptic through more neutral terms. 
We can agree with the contextualist account that the sceptic, in employing the above argument, 
seeks to raise the epistemic standard, and that this in turn affects what we communicate in 
attributing knowledge. But as per modest variability, we remain neutral regarding the truth-
conditional content of 1-3. We are only interested in the claim that in raising the epistemic 
standard, the sceptic affects what sentences like 1-3 communicate, and that this can be viewed as 
aggressive, as a kind of power move.  
A natural response to Brister’s description of the sceptic is that this isn’t exactly a bully we should 
be worried about, for two reasons. First, we do not actually meet sceptics in everyday life, and 
while they do seem to show up on occasion in philosophy seminars, I think it is reasonable to 
doubt whether they manage to consistently live by their professed scepticism outside of the 
classroom. So while we may have to tread carefully in philosophical corridors, the immediate 
danger of meeting this brand of bully is minimal and thus not particularly interesting as far as our 
theory of epistemic wrongdoings goes. Secondly, even if sceptics were two-a-penny, it doesn’t 
seem like the power they wield is particularly great. All the sceptic achieves is to affect what we 
communicate by attributing knowledge within a context; they haven’t affected our credence or 
evidence or obviously harmed us, nor have they affected our reputation as epistemic agents.8 So 
we shouldn’t worry about the sceptic because i) they’re not exactly a common occurrence and ii) 
their power to raise the epistemic standard does not seem particularly significant.  
In response to the first reason, it is worth bearing in mind that while philosophical sceptics may 
be quite rare, the behaviour of the sceptic may be an extreme instance of a kind of behaviour that 
we do find in more ordinary discourse. In the next section, I will attempt to outline particular cases 
that I take to resemble the sceptic’s behaviour in important ways.  
 
8 This is particularly pertinent given that, in line with modest variability, no particular claim is made here about 
whether the sceptic affects semantic or pragmatic content, or whether the sceptic robs us of our knowledge in some 
metaphysical sense. All that is claimed is that the sceptic affects what is communicated by knowledge statements.  
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In response to the second reason, it is important to keep in mind that even if the sceptic’s power 
- to affect what is communicated by attributing knowledge - is ultimately a linguistic one, it doesn’t 
follow that it is unimportant. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the idea that 
philosophy should not only keep track of what concepts we do employ, but what concepts we 
ought to employ (Burgess and Plunkett 2013a, b, Cappelen 2018). Burgess and Plunkett label this 
broader project conceptual ethics. There are two motivations behind this project. One is more 
theoretical and has its roots in Carnap (1950); the idea is that to theorise precisely on a given topic, 
we need to employ theoretical concepts that are not incoherent, problematically vague, or 
problematically ambiguous. Some of our ordinary concepts may not meet these criteria, and so we 
must explicate such concepts for theoretical purposes. The other motivation is more practical, and 
has its roots in the work of Haslanger (2000), among others. The idea is that the concepts we 
employ affect the way we think about a given topic, and in so doing will impact upon our decisions 
and actions on that topic. If that is true, then some concepts affect us in bad ways and some in 
good ways.9 This issue is perhaps most clearly seen in forms of discourse where a great deal rides 
on using the correct concepts. The concept of “rape” is a good example: in many countries the 
legal definition of “rape” has been redefined so that it can apply to an occurrence between a 
married couple. Doing so has been important not only so that incidences of marital rape are treated 
within the law as instances of rape, but so that the wider perception and discourse surrounding 
marital rape could be changed. In this respect, it is clear that the revised definition is an 
improvement on the older one, and this illustrates clearly that there are ethical questions about the 
concepts we employ.10 
 
9 That this form of conceptual engineering rests on the idea that concepts can affect us in good and bad ways reveals 
that this project requires some form of prior theory of value, of what is good and bad. In domains where the value 
theory will also be contested (such as in the moral domain) it becomes difficult to engage upon this project of 
engineering our concepts so that they affect us in good ways. But there may still be cases where it is uncontentious 
that a concept could be improved. Thanks go to Brad Hooker for emphasising this point.  
10 On one view of what concepts are, the idea that we could modify concepts does not really make sense. If we hold 
the view that a concept is defined by its conditions of application, then it doesn’t really make sense to ask whether a 
concept would be improved by altering those conditions of application. So clearly the conceptual ethics project must 
delineate concepts some other way. Perhaps the clearest alternative is to view concepts in terms of the functional 
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This practical motivation can plausibly be generalised beyond cases like ‘rape’ - where the potential 
harm involved is so severe - so that the question of conceptual ethics can be asked for a very wide 
array of terms:  
Arguably, our conceptual repertoire determines not only what beliefs we can have 
but also what hypotheses we can entertain, what desires we can form, what plans 
we can make on the basis of such mental states, and accordingly constrains what 
we can hope to accomplish in the world […] Conceptual choices and changes may 
be intrinsically interesting, but the clearest reason to care about them is just that 
their non-conceptual consequences are pervasive and profound. (Burgess and 
Plunkett 2013a, pp. 1096-7) 
This alone should make it unsurprising that the question of conceptual ethics could be applied to 
our knowledge discourse. That is, there is not only the question of what our knowledge attributions 
mean, but what they ought to mean.11 This becomes all-the-more pressing if we allow that 
knowledge plays some important role in our epistemic lives and this is one claim for which we can 
find broad agreement in the literature. Some have argued that knowledge is the basis for assertion 
or action; some have argued that knowledge serves to terminate inquiry; some have argued that 
knowledge serves to tag credible informants, and some have argued that knowledge possesses a 
distinctively epistemic value beyond its use in practical reasoning. But what the above views all 
agree upon is that knowledge plays an important role in our epistemic lives, and once we 
acknowledge this importance, the project of trying to understand what knowledge is for and which 
concept would best serve that purpose seems well-motivated.  
The question of conceptual ethics is usually viewed as a revisionary one insofar as we are 
considering the possibility of changing our otherwise stable conceptual apparatus. But when we 
 
role that they play. On this view, we ask of a concept C what role it plays in our cognitive lives, and then we 
consider how C could be modified so as to best fulfil that role.  
11 Indeed, the concept of knowledge is the subject of Haslanger’s revisionist program in (Haslanger 1999). 
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are considering context-sensitive communication, as we are in the case of knowledge attributions, 
there is the related question of how we ought to set the meanings of our context-sensitive 
expressions for the purposes of a conversation. The question is not whether we should seek a 
linguistic change in the meaning of “know”, but how we should set the meaning of the term within 
a context. Plunkett and Sundell have argued that the question of conceptual ethics can arise just as 
easily for context-sensitive content as it can for invariant content. Considering the case of the 
context-sensitive term “spicy”, they write: 
An agreement amongst all the cooks in the kitchen that the chili can be described 
as “spicy” plays an important role in collective decision-making. In particular, it 
plays an important role in decision-making about whether to add more spice.  
(Plunkett and Sundell 2013, p. 15) 
In this way, setting the meaning of “spicy” within a context is going to be important because it will 
affect set boundaries in terms of permissible actions. If we set the standard of spice to be very 
high, then this will affect when the criticism of something being “too spicy” comes into play. 
Plunkett and Sundell subsequently argue that the importance of setting the context-sensitive 
meanings of terms can give rise to metalinguistic disagreements over how to use a term, and that the 
phenomenon of metalinguistic disagreements can be used to provide an alternative explanation of 
the faultless disagreement cases that have been elsewhere used to argue for semantic relativism 
about particular expressions (such as taste predicates). Similarly, Ludlow (2014) has argued that, 
because context-sensitivity is pervasive, metalinguistic disagreements over what a term ought to 
mean for the purposes of a context can arise for nearly any term in a language, and he includes 
examples of disagreements surrounding the meaning of “sandwich”, “planet”, “athlete”, and many 
more terms. 
The important point for our purposes is not whether context-sensitivity is pervasive, nor whether 
knowledge attributions are context-sensitive in a way similar to “spicy” and other terms, nor 
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whether metalinguistic disagreements provide a good explanation of faultless disagreement cases. 
The important point here is that once we allow that knowledge attributions vary in what they 
communicate, and we allow that knowledge discourse is of particular importance, it becomes clear 
that the question of what knowledge attributions communicate within a context is an important 
one. Knowledge discourse performs an important function in our epistemic lives, and so what 
knowledge attributions mean within a context will affect the extent to which knowledge discourse 
can play that role.  
Returning to the actions of the sceptic, we now have reason to be more suspicious of their 
behaviour. If there is an importance in what our knowledge attributions communicate, and sceptics 
are changing what knowledge attributions communicate to fit their own purposes, then we can see 
now that the sceptic’s actions are not inconsequential but could actually have negative effects on 
our epistemic lives. And while the sceptic might be something of a rarity, as I argued earlier, the 
sceptic’s behaviour may be an extreme form of a more general behaviour that is much more 
common. Attempts to raise the epistemic standard may be an ordinary part of our epistemic lives and 
there may be right and wrong ways to do this. In the following section, I will focus on one such 
case and will attempt to provide a partial diagnosis of what has gone wrong.  
3. Wrongful standard-raising 
In order to motivate the idea that there can be wrongful raisings of the epistemic standard, I will 
take my cue from Brister’s discussion of the climate change denier: 
The climate science community considers the denialist strategy to be specifically 
designed to side-line inquiry away from practical goals and to engage scientists in 
a quixotic conversation about standards of justification, such as what counts as 
scientific consensus and whether there is a scientific conspiracy.  
(Brister 2017, p. 65) 
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There is a clear kind of epistemic behaviour often displayed by the climate change denier where 
an attempt is made to claim that the evidence provided in favour of climate change does not meet 
the standard that they think we ought to operate by. The following case outlines the kind of 
behaviour I have in mind:  
Climate change: John is a climate skeptic and Sally is not. Sally says “Of course 
we can know that man-made climate change is occurring. The heat-trapping effect 
of CO2 is well-established. The CO2 levels are the highest they have been for 
millions of years, and we are starting to see the predicted effects of the increased 
temperatures”. John responds: “First, you can’t rule out the possibility that those 
CO2 figures are just wrong. I, for one, don’t trust the IPCC’s figures. Secondly, I 
could accept everything you have just said, but it still wouldn’t prove that the man-
made rise in CO2 levels is causing the earth to warm up. You just can’t know that. 
It’s speculation.” Annoyed, Sally nevertheless doesn’t dispute what John says and 
the conversation moves on.  
I suggest that in this case, John is attempting to raise the epistemic standard, and furthermore there 
is something inappropriate in his attempt to do so. The case bears similarities to other cases where 
the epistemic standard is raised, such as the bank case: notably, John raises a possible alternative 
that Sally cannot straightforwardly rule out, and then on that basis argues that Sally cannot know 
that the rise in CO2 levels is causing the earth to warm up. I would also suggest that use of the 
word “prove” is often indicative of this kind of behaviour; it is an attempt to say to a person that 
their evidence is not sufficient given the standard that is in play at that point. Furthermore, Sally, 
although annoyed, does allow John’s more stringent use of ‘know’ by choosing not to challenge 
him. A great deal of work has been done on proposing theories of how the epistemic standard 
rises and falls, and I will not provide a complete account here. But I am committed to the claim 
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that there are cases like Climate change where the epistemic standard is successfully raised, even if 
there is something indecent about it.  
If we are going to diagnose John’s behaviour as in some sense indecent, then we face the challenge 
of identifying what makes it indecent. In particular, we have to provide some way of distinguishing 
Climate change from cases where the standard is raised but not inappropriately. The remainder of 
this section will be focused on sketching a way that this might be done.  
One initial approach would be to draw on some of the recent work that has been done on 
conceptual engineering in order to capture John’s behaviour as a case of inappropriate conceptual 
engineering. Hansen (2019) distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful metalinguistic 
proposals – attempts to get speakers to adopt a proposed use. One way to be successful with a 
metalinguistic proposal is to hold the appropriate kind of linguistic authority. For example, “a 
journal editor could require an author to use ‘they’ and ‘their’ as gender-neutral pronouns instead 
of ‘he’ and ‘his’” (p. 3). But one can also make metalinguistic proposals without any special 
authority if one is “backed by reasons that justify the speaker’s belief that using a particular 
expression in a particular way is a good idea” (p. 3). So in order to instigate a change in meaning, 
one must be backed by good reasons. It is useful to consider whether we can apply this idea to 
Climate change and argue that John lacks the requisite reasons. However, merely saying that John 
raises the standard for the wrong reason just raises the question of what the good and bad reasons 
for raising the epistemic standard are. To answer this, we have to be more specific in thinking not 
just about the possibility of meaning change and metalinguistic proposals more generally, but of 
the possibility of changing our knowledge discourse. In this way, our focus shifts from the 
linguistic to the epistemic.  
In order to consider ways that the epistemic standard could be inappropriately manipulated, it is 
worth considering what the function of a variable epistemic standard is. A full account of the 
function of a variable epistemic standard will necessarily appeal to what the point is of having any 
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epistemic standard in the first place i.e. what the point is of having a knowledge threshold, rather 
just having evidence, credences, beliefs, etc. As alluded to earlier, there are a range of possible 
answers to this question (the role of knowledge in assertion, action etc.), and it is a substantial 
theoretical task to discern whether such answers can be viewed as consistent with one another. 
The answer I want to focus on appeals simply to the value of knowledge. With knowledge comes 
value of a particular kind, and it is not clear that we could still possess that value in the same way 
if there was no distinction between knowledge and mere belief. Of course, this is only informative 
once we provide some account of what it is about knowledge that makes it valuable, but here I 
will rely upon some fairly general remarks without providing a detailed theory. We can distinguish 
between two kinds of value that knowledge arguably has. First, knowledge clearly has a practical 
value in being such that it can play a role in our practical deliberations, and so help us navigate our 
way around our environment and meet our aims and desires. If I want to get to Larissa, then my 
knowing how to get to Larissa will be of clear practical value. Secondly (and more controversially) 
knowledge arguably possesses a value that goes beyond its practical use, a kind of purely epistemic 
value. That is, we value knowledge purely in virtue of being the kind of inquisitive creatures that 
we are. Goldman sums up these two kinds of value well: 
“All men by nature desire to know.” So said Aristotle (1923) and he was right. 
Information seeking is a pervasive activity of human life. We scan the horizon to 
see if rain is imminent, we watch the news to learn who has been elected, and we 
listen to the traffic report to anticipate delays in our drive to work. Our interest in 
information has two sources: curiosity and practical concerns. The dinosaur 
extinction fascinates us, although knowing its cause would have no material impact 
on our lives. We also seek knowledge for practical reasons, as when we solicit a 
physician’s diagnosis or compare prices at automobile dealerships.  
(Goldman 1999, p. 3) 
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So the value of knowledge - both practical and purely epistemic - gives us some explanation of 
why we should have an epistemic standard at all. But why a variable epistemic standard? It is notable 
that in work on epistemic standards (particularly in the contextualism and pragmatic encroachment 
literature), there are two recognised ways that the standard might rise. First, the standard might 
rise due to the high practical stakes involved in being right about the believed proposition. This is 
one way to interpret the bank case – the fact that it is much more important that Keith is right on 
whether the bank is open on Saturday raises the epistemic standard to a point where it can no 
longer be said that Keith does know the bank will be open. The other way is less concerned with 
practical stakes and more concerned with pursuing a more stringent form of inquiry. For example, 
the contextualist account of the sceptic is as someone who does not raise the standard because of 
the practical stakes involved, but because they seek to make certain possibilities salient. What is 
striking is that these two ways that the epistemic standard are raised match up fairly well to the 
two kinds of value associated with knowledge that were outlined in the previous paragraph. 
Practical stakes raising clearly corresponds to the practical value possessed by knowledge, while 
stringent inquiry raising clearly corresponds to the (more controversial) purely epistemic value 
possessed by knowledge. What this suggests is that the variable epistemic standard is a way of 
better pursuing these kinds of value. On the one hand, in some contexts, the practical benefit in 
being right will be such that the practical value of knowledge will be enhanced by adjusting what 
it means to know. On the other hand, in some contexts, the purely epistemic benefit in pursuing 
a form of inquiry will be such that the epistemic value of knowledge will be enhanced by adjusting 
what it means to know. I suggest then, that there are only two very broad reasons to raise the 
epistemic standard. It is only permissible to raise the epistemic standard if: 
• A more stringent epistemic standard would allow for a more practically valuable 
conception of knowledge, given the practical stakes involved, or 
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• A more stringent epistemic standard would allow for a more epistemically valuable 
conception of knowledge, given the nature of your inquiry.  
The key claim of this paper, then, is that John in Climate change fails to meet this condition. He is 
attempting to raise the epistemic standard, not because he takes the practical stakes to call for it, 
nor does he genuinely want to pursue a more stringent form of inquiry, but because he is hoping 
to obfuscate, dominate an argument, and possibly even shut down inquiry. It is in this sense that 
we can label John’s standard raising as inappropriate and we can distinguish from other cases – 
such as the bank case – where the standard is raised but not for inappropriate reason.  
Earlier, I used Brister's work on the sceptic as bully as a motivation to look for more ordinary 
cases of inappropriate standard-raising, of which I count Climate Change as one instance. But isn't 
there an important difference here between the sceptic and John - isn't the sceptic attempting to 
engage in a more stringent form of inquiry, in precisely the way I have argued can lead to an 
acceptable form of standard-raising? If what I have said is right, there is nothing wrong with the 
sceptic's raising of the standard per se provided that they do so in the pursuit of a more stringent 
form of epistemic inquiry. I think that is right and would help capture the fact that sometimes - in 
academia or elsewhere - we do pursue a form of inquiry with a higher standard, if only for our 
own curiosity. Provided that this is done to pursue the epistemic value of knowledge , I argue that 
there is nothing wrong in doing so. The same point applies to John. The explanandum of the paper 
has been the apparent wrongness of John's behaviour. I have argued that his behaviour seems 
wrong insofar as it is natural to interpret his behaviour as motivated by the wrong kind of reasons. 
But John's reasons for acting as he does were not explicitly included as part of the case, so as it 
stands it is consistent with my account that John is in fact raising the standard in an acceptable 
way.12 Strictly then, my account should only be committed to the following conditional: if John is 
raising the epistemic standard for reasons other than those outlined by my account, then he is 
 
12 Thank you to an anonymous referee for emphasising this point. 
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acting in an epistemically wrongful way. It is this conditional, and the fact that we naturally interpret 
John as making the antecedent true, that explains the apparent wrongfulness of the case. But it is 
consistent with my account that there may be nothing wrong with being a climate change denier 
per se just as there may be nothing wrong with being an external world sceptic. 
My account is attractive insofar as it captures similar cases that have been previously discussed in 
the literature. Blome-Tillman (2014, p. 19) discusses a humorous case where a teenage boy is 
caught sneaking back home in the middle of the night by his parents. Imagine that the boy 
responds to being caught by saying “You can’t know that I was sneaking in just now. After all, you 
may have dreamt that, or you may be a brain in a vat”. Blome-Tillman’s point is that this is an 
unsuccessful attempt at raising the epistemic standard provided that the parents fail to take the 
possibilities that the boy raises seriously. But suppose that the boy is successful in raising the 
epistemic standard and the parents subsequently ruminate on the possibility of being a brain in a 
vat rather than admonishing their son. There still seems to be something epistemically 
inappropriate in what the boy has done. This is precisely what my account predicts: the boy raised 
the epistemic standard for unacceptable reasons – he did it to avoid punishment rather than to 
pursue the value of knowledge.  
Thus far I have only tried to find a way to negatively evaluate John’s standard-raising in Climate 
change. I haven’t gone so far as to discuss the possibility that there is any kind of epistemic harm or 
injustice involved in the case, and indeed, this is not something I will do in any great detail in this 
paper. That said, it is worth noticing that there is a strong similarity between John’s behaviour and 
the notion of hermeneutical injustice as introduced by Fricker (2007). Hermeneutical injustice occurs 
when there is a lacuna in the collective epistemic resources that prevents the proper understanding 
of a given phenomenon. Most clearly, this occurs when a society lacks some concept that would 
be required in order to understand a particular kind of experience. One of Fricker’s central cases 
is that in which a society lacked the concept of sexual assault, and so women and others who 
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suffered experiences that fall under that concept were unable to properly understand or 
communicate about their experience. There is a sense in which John is attempting to instil a kind 
of localised hermeneutical injustice. Inappropriate standard raisers such as John follow the tactic 
of the sceptic by raising the epistemic standard to such a level that the distinction between knowers 
and non-knowers no longer cuts interestingly across our epistemic community. In doing so, the 
standard raiser robs us of the distinction between knowers and non-knowers that would otherwise 
have been in play had the epistemic standard not been raised. Now clearly, this isn’t hermeneutical 
injustice in the usual sense insofar as we regain access to that distinction once the epistemic 
standard returns to a normal level. But in that instant, in that context, we are momentarily 
prevented from using knowledge terminology to properly describe one another’s epistemic 
positions regarding the proposition at hand. In that sense, we can view the behaviour of John and 
other standard-raisers as a kind of fleeting, micro-form of hermeneutical injustice.13 
I will finish by considering an objection. It could be argued that it is not possible for an instance 
of standard-raising to be inappropriate in the sense that I have outlined simply because the 
epistemic standard is always where it ought to be. Robin McKenna (2013) argues for a contextualist 
view of this kind, according to which “S knows p” is true in c only if S can rule out the alternatives 
that ought to be considered given the practical stakes involved in c. According to this normatively 
loaded view, it would either have to be the case that John successfully raises the epistemic standard 
and does so appropriately, or that he attempts and fails to raise the epistemic standard. I am not 
entirely averse to this alternative account of John as attempting and failing to raise the epistemic 
standards, and I think that much of what I have said in this paper could be accommodated in such 
a view. However, I prefer a view of the epistemic standard as one that is primarily sensitive to 
conversational manoeuvres within a discourse of inquiry, such as the making salient of certain 
 
13 Fricker (2007, p. 22 ff.) is less inclined to describe a harm as an injustice if it is of a lesser severity and she is also 
primarily concerned with systematic rather than incidental cases. It may be for these reasons that the phenomenon 
of wrongful standard-raising does not constitute a form of hermeneutical injustice. My point is simply here to 
highlight the important similarity between the two phenomena – that both are cases where   
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alternative possibilities and certain practical stakes. In that sense, I prefer to adopt a view of the 
epistemic standard such that it can be manipulated by nefarious actors. This better fits with the 
wider picture from which conceptual engineering has been encouraged, according to which it is an 
open question whether we are using the concepts that are best suited to our purposes.   
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have identified wrongful raisings of the epistemic standard as nefarious attempts 
at contextually-restricted conceptual engineering regarding our knowledge discourse. Furthermore, 
I have provided a partial theory of what it is about such cases that make them inappropriate, and 
in doing so I have argued that there are two broad reasons to raise the epistemic standard and that 
inappropriate standard-raisings (such as Climate change) are characterized by the fact that neither 
reason is acted upon.  
To end, it is worth returning to where we started. In discussing cases where the standard is raised 
wrongfully, I have sought to employ a more neutral terminology so that the conclusions of this 
paper are consistent with a range of background views on the epistemic standard (e.g. 
contextualism, pragmatic encroachment views, etc.). The possibility of using less theoretically-
committed claims such as modest variability has been largely overlooked in discussion of the 
epistemic standard, and this leads to the worry that epistemological progress on the epistemic 
standard and the role it plays is stifled until difficult issues surrounding semantics, pragmatics, and 
theory of knowledge are settled. In this paper, I hope to have shown how further insights can be 
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